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In Grayson v. Lyons, Prentiss & McCord,' plaintiff sought in-
junctive relief and damages for the building of a road with
ditches across his land to effect contact with a well site upon
land adjoining his with which his land had been pooled by the
Conservation Commissioner's order. He had not been consulted
as to the road's location or construction. He was, however, re-
ceiving a share of the oil produced. The district court's judgment
refusing injunction but awarding $357.00 in damages was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court. As an equitable matter, the de-
cision would seem to be correct. Since the plaintiff was accept-
ing a share of production from the well, he might well be said
to have.been estopped to complain regarding a road to the well
which was necessary to its operation. This criteria was not
stated, however, if it be the secret of the decision. The rationale
of the judgment does not clearly emerge. The confusing part lies
in the apparent dealing with two servitudes, one a mineral servi-
tude and the other that of passage, both discontinuous, requiring
title, and subject to loss by non-user of ten years.
The court devoted some discussion to the mineral servitude
which burdened the land when plaintiff bought it in 1936. How-
ever, the facts, perhaps incomplete, indicate no use of this servi-
tude until 1950 and unitization did not occur until 1951. Certain-
ly the principle, that upon a grant of a servitude, such reason-
able appurtenances as are necessary to its effective use go with
it, is well grounded by Code, jurisprudence, and common sense.
Thus, if the mineral servitude burdening plaintiff's land at the
time of his acquisition had not been lost by prescription, there
would seem to have been no issue. If it had been lost, obviously
any appurtenances would have fallen with it.
A servitude of passage in the roadway seemed to have been
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kept alive by user but the road's deviation caused by defendants
during their repairs was upon plaintiff's land and he had not
granted its passage. If the mineral servitude upon plaintiff's
lands had expired and he had granted no servitude of passage,
then it would appear that the plea for injunction should have
been honored. The words of the opinion suggest, however, that
the mineral servitude was still in existence by undisclosed means
and thus it is puzzling as to why damages were due as the new
road seemed to have been constructed in a reasonable fashion
and without unnecessary inconvenience.
In Huckabay v. The Texas Co. 2 owners of land and of one-
eighth of minerals, not being parties to a recorded lease, sued
lessee owners of the servitude who were entitled to seven-eighths
of minerals, for one-eighth of production. The lessees admitted
the plaintiffs' right but insisted that they should pay their pro-
portionate share of the cost of exploration and production. Re-
versing the decision of the court of appeal, the Supreme Court
held that the lessee's position was correct.
That a servitude owner's right to search is absolute and sep-
arate and apart from that belonging to any other servitude owner
or of the landowner, regardless of what fractional benefits of
the several rights to search may be, is undoubtedly correct. Cer-
tainly no bad faith may be attributed to proper exercise of a legal
right. The principle of unjust enrichment is indisputable. The
approach to or appreciation of the facts bearing upon the faith
of the lessee, however, taken by the Supreme Court seems to vary
from that of the court of appeal. 3 The latter court apparently
was much impressed by the earnest efforts of the plaintiffs,
properly implemented, to become parties to the lease given by the
servitude owners with title to seven-eighths of the benefits of the
search by themselves or their lessee. The analogy to rights of a
co-owner of land or lease against his non-consenting co-owner is
interesting but fails to point out that the right to partition is
ever present in those cases. Obviously, if a co-owner stands idly
by and does not exercise his right to stop actions which he does
not approve, he should not share in benefits without proper con-
tribution to their acquisition.
Since separate servitude owners and landowners are not co-
2. 227 La. 191, 78 So.2d 829 (1955).
3. 73 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1954) ; See 3 OIL AND GAS REPORTER 1889 (1954).
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owners and therefore the right of partition does not lie, there
would appear to be no relief in cases of search by one considered
inadvisable by others. Had the owners of but one-eighth bene-
fits been unreasonable, i.e., had refused to sign an acceptable
lease or had as landowners, purported to wait out the lapse of
the servitude, the equities of the searchers would be more con-
vincing. On the other hand, if every reasonable effort had been
made by the plaintiffs to become signatories of the lease desired
by the servitude owners and were refused and ignored by the
lessee, as the lower court seemed to find, then the plight of a
small benefit owner would appear to be rather desperate and the
unjust enrichment doctrine applied to the wrong party.
In Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co.4 suit was filed by a
landowner under R.S. 30:101 to clear title of a mineral servitude.
The servitude had not been used for a period of ten years from
date of grant. The main defenses were that the servitude's term
had been lengthened by virtue of an obstacle to user, namely the
filing of suit, and that the suit in question had the effect of in-
terrupting the running of prescription. The court found that no
obstacle had been raised as the landowner had never refused
access and, indeed, had signed a lease with defendant's lessee
specifying intent to facilitate the development of the property.
It was also found that the filing of the suit did not interrupt pre-
scription as the article cited by the defendant had nothing to do
with servitude. Attorneys' fees under the statute were not al-
lowed as there was a bona fide dispute.
The court's firm statements regarding the plea of obstacle
would seem to be well supported by the facts. Since the litigants
had subscribed to a lease that development might not be hindered,
obviously all parties were safeguarded whatever the outcome of
the suit, when title to benefits would be decided. The decision in
no case can be said to indicate that, under a different set of facts,
suit might not result in presenting an obstacle. The court's ex-
planation of the inapplicability of the provision on interruption
of prescription by suit to servitudes is clear and satisfactory.
Certainly, an intolerable result would have resulted had every
suit to settle ownership of a mineral servitude been found to have
resulted in a new ten-year period for the servitude.
The court again emphasizes the fundamental distinction be-
4. 227 La. 1044, 81 So.2d 389 (1955).
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tween lease and servitude. The cases on extension of a lease be-
cause of unsuccessful suit by a lessor are clearly distinguishable
from the provisions considered in the instant case.
Obviously, the court decided the question of "bona fide dis-
pute" under the statute providing for procedures to erase a servi-
tude from the record. The lower court was sustained in finding
good faith and thus attorney fees were not assessed though there
were none too subtle suggestions in the body of the opinion that
the defense was motivated by production.
Lease
A slander of title action failed in Wilson v. The California
Co.5 for lack of proof. Recorded documents evidencing various
contracts were offered as proof since they referred to lands of
the plaintiff burdened only by a servitude of passage belonging
to the United States Government. Mention of these tracts was
found to have been for purposes of identification only without
reference to ownership and hence were not slander of title. To
effect cancellation of a void lease from the record, plaintiff
should have proceeded otherwise.
In Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.6 lessor sought to cancel a lease for
failure to drill or pay. The defense was that the operating agree-
ment under the terms of the lease continued the lease in force
by virtue of a producing well in a unit including part of the
lessor's property but not located on his land. The Supreme Court
held that inasmuch as the producing well was in existence before
the unit was formed, the promise to drill on the tract or pay for
deferment of operations had not been fulfilled.
The terms of the lease in question were long and complicated
and would appear to have been most carefully drawn in the
lessee's interest. It was clear, however, that the producer came
in when no unit existed either under the Conservation Depart-
ment's order or under a permissive clause of the lease contract.
The Commissioner's order covered two shallower sands but not
the deep one from which production was secured. Thus, the drill
or pay clause was breached and the lease cancelled. Attorney's
fees were payable by the lessee under R.S. 30:102 as the statutory
requirements for notice, etc., had been met by the lessor. The
5. 226 La. 144, 75 So.2d 224 (1954).
6. 226 La. 417, 76 So.2d 416 (1954).
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signing of a division order in connection with production from
the well drilled before unitization was not a ratification of les-
see's pooling arrangements as the lessors were unaware of the
pooling when they signed. No estoppel was created for the same
reason, even as to one of the plaintiffs who had cashed four roy-
alty checks. The fact that the lessee silently moved to effect a
pooling, recording the document on the final day before a delay
rental for failure to drill was due, seemed rightfully to have influ-
enced the court's approach.
In Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Co.7 plaintiffs brought
jactitation suits claiming possession of minerals by virtue of
their possession of the surface and maintaining that defendants
were slandering their title by recording certain deeds and min-
eral leases and by extracting oil from their tracts under a spacing
order of the Commissioner. At the time of the suit plaintiffs had
physically possessed the land for over the thirty years necessary
for bad faith acquisition by prescription. The defendants, record
title owners, had granted a lease after the thirty-year period had
run. Wells had been drilled but not upon the plaintiffs' claimed
lands. However, these lands became a part of the drilling units
ordered by the Commissioner before completion of the wells and
were being drained. Thus the defendants asserted possession of
the minerals. It was held that the plaintiffs were in possession of
the minerals as well as the surface and hence could bring a suit
in jactitation.
This decision is of unusual importance because of its bearing
on several basic elements of mineral law. The case of Lenard v.
Shell Oil Co." held that an owner of land whose title clearly
showed an outstanding mineral servitude was not in possession
of the minerals under his land while the servitude was in posses-
sion of others by virtue of its exercise on land outside of the tract
claimed under ten years good faith possession but burdened by
the single servitude covering all the land. This holding was re-
affirmed by the instant decision. The important distinction was
that "a lease is not a mineral servitude" but merely a contract,
not attached to the land itself. Act 205 of 1938 appeared to have
been an attempt to deny this most important distinction but was
held to have but procedural effect. Act 6 of the Second Extra
Session of 1950 added the word "substantive," which indicated
7. 226 La. 911, 77 So.2d 533 (1954).
8. 211 La. 265, 29 So.2d 844 (1947).
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displeasure with the decisions. This legislation9 was honored in
the instant case but was held not to affect the important distinc-
tion between servitude and lease, though they were both "real
rights." The dissenting justice apparently felt that since sepa-
rate possession of land and minerals under servitude were recog-
nized, the same should be true under lease. Since the slander of
title was continuing, the one-year prescription relating to posses-
sory actions did not apply. Withdrawal of oil from under the
land under the Commissioner's order was not a physical disturb-
ance of the surface holder within the meaning of the law dealing
with possession.
A suit for $372,000 damages for failure to produce was
brought in Ludeau v. Continental Oil Co.,10 alleging abandon-
ment with intent to defraud. Several contracts were involved,
the critical one having provided for an option to drill on certain
acreage which if exercised with production resulting would en-
title plaintiffs to one-half of seven-eighths, less costs. The option
was exercised and, after two unsuccessful attempts and an ex-
penditure of over $200,000, operations were discontinued. Con-
flicting testimony of geologists was heard. Plaintiff's major
point seemed to be that there were presently two hundred pro-
ducing wells within a radius of two miles. The burden of proof
of fraud or failure to diligently attempt to produce was not sus-
tained.
The allegations of the plaintiff appear to be rather novel.
The court remarked that defendants had not obligated themselves
to produce oil. There was a suggestion in the opinion that had
present day advanced methods obtained at the date of the at-
tempt to produce, that plaintiff's suit might have been success-
ful. Hindsight observations on defendant's methods obviously
were not impressive. Moreover, the court remarked that "specu-
lation and uncertainty are inherent in all drilling operations.""
The most convincing testimony of defendants would appear to
have been the amount of money spent in their unsuccessful ef-
forts. The fact that minerals were being extracted from the
twenty acres in question through nearby wells was apparently
not proved, though the twenty-acre spacing order of the Commis-
sioner of Conservation seems pertinent and impressive.
9. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950).
10. 226 La. 1053, 78 So.2d 170 (1955).
11. Id. at 1059, 78 So.2d at 172.
(Vol. XVI
1956] CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
In Wier v. Grubb" a sublessor sought cancellation because of
failure to properly develop the area covered by the sublease, after
oil was discovered in paying quantities as provided in the lease.
The rule of the Louisiana Code of Practice13 regarding time
for filing an answer to an appeal was applied. It was firmly
stated to be that filing must occur at least three days before the
date fixed for argument without regard to holidays and without
count of either the day of filing or that of argument.
On the merits, three producers and one dry well in a rela-
tively small area compared to the acreage of the sublease were
held not to constitute diligent development. 14 Lessee had been
placed in formal default, which was ignored. R.S. 30:102 in re-
gard to attorneys' fees was applied and an award of $3,000 made.
The court clearly stated that the question of diligent develop-
ment is so largely one of fact that no set rule can be adopted and
a determination must be reached in individual cases. The plea
that economic loss would result by continued drilling was no
justification as ready relief was available by yielding the area
to the lessor, who indeed, had made repeated demands before f or-
mal placing in default.
Reiteration in the instant case of the implied obligation to
develop every part of the property occurs as does the rule of prof-
itability to both parties. The statutory protection to a lessor
when forced to sue seemed particularly valuable in this case as
a lessor might well be at the mercy of a lessee determined to hold
without further development because of the heavy costs involved.
The controversy in the instant case reached the Supreme Court
before in 1949.15 The statute then was construed to apply to sub-
leases as well as to leases, as a sublessor assumes all the rights
and obligations of a lessor. It is heartening to observe the court's
attitude in the instant and other recent cases toward a lessee who,
while refusing to further develop, wishes to hold a lease indefi-
nitely for purposes which could only be profitable to himself.
In Texas Co. v. McDonald'6 a concursus proceeding was
brought by an oil company to determine ownership of royalties.
12. 82 So.2d 1 (La. 1955).
13. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 890 (1870).
14. See Wier v. Grubb, 215 La. 967, 41 So.2d 846 (1949).
15. Ibid.
16. 82 So.2d 37 (La. 1955).
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Two chains of title were involved and uncertainty of title was
known. Many deals were made. Finally a compromise was
reached. The defense was that the compromise was procured by
threat of a putting in default for failure to drill offset wells
when it was legally impossible to do so. The court held that there
was no duress in threatening to do that which is provided for by
law.
The many transactions involved made it clear that claimants
were unsure of title to an area of great desirability. Certainly
a legal right to place in default for failure to carry out an express
provision in a lease exists. It appears that the court was correct
in finding that the compromise was a mere "balancing the dam-
age of losing" against the "hope of gaining."
17. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3071 (1870).
